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Abstract 
 
The globalisation of banking markets has raised important issues regarding corporate 
governance regulation for banking institutions.  This research paper addresses some of 
the major issues of corporate governance as it relates to banking regulation.  The 
traditional principal-agent framework will be used to analyse some of the major issues 
involving corporate governance and banking institutions.  It begins by analysing the 
emerging international regime of bank corporate governance.  This has been set forth 
in Pillar II of the amended Basel Capital Accord.  Pillar II provides a detailed 
framework for how bank supervisors and bank management should interact with 
respect to the management of banking institutions and the impact this may have on 
financial stability.  The paper will then analyse corporate governance and banking 
regulation in the United Kingdom and United States.  Although UK corporate 
governance regulation has traditionally not focused on the special role of banks and 
financial institutions, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 has sought to fill 
this gap by authorizing the FSA to devise rules and regulations to enhance corporate 
governance for financial firms. In the US, corporate governance for banking 
institutions is regulated by federal and state statute and regulation.  Federal regulation 
provides a prescriptive framework for directors and senior management in exercising 
their management responsibilities.  US banking regulation also addresses governance 
problems in bank and financial holding companies.  For reasons of financial stability, 
the paper argues that national banking law and regulation should permit the bank 
regulator to play the primary role in establishing governance standards for banks, 
financial institutions and bank/financial holding companies.  The regulator is best 
positioned to represent and to balance the various stakeholder interests.  The UK 
regulatory regime succeeds in this area, while the US regulatory approach has been 
limited by US court decisions that restrict the role that the regulator can play in 
imposing prudential directives on banks and bank holding companies.  FSA 
regulatory rules have enhanced accountability in the financial sector by creating 
objective standards of conduct for senior management and directors of financial 
companies.  The paper suggests that efficient banking regulation requires regulators to 
be entrusted with discretion to represent broader stakeholder interests in order to 
ensure that banks operate under good governance standards, and that judicial 
intervention can lead to suboptimal regulatory results.     
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Corporate Governance and Banking Regulation:  
The Regulator as Stakeholder  
 
 
The role of financial regulation in influencing the development of corporate 
governance principles has become an important policy issue that has received little 
attention in the literature.  To date, most research on corporate governance has 
addressed issues that affect companies and firms in the non-financial sector.  
Corporate governance regulation in the financial sector has traditionally been 
regarded as a specialist area that has fashioned its standards and rules to achieve the 
overriding objectives of financial regulation - safety and soundness of the financial 
system, and consumer and investor protection.  In the case of banking regulation, the 
traditional principal-agent model used to analyse the relationship between 
shareholders and directors and managers has given way to broader policy concerns to 
maintain financial stability and ensure that banks are operated in a way that promotes 
broader economic growth as well as enhancing shareholder value.   
 
Recent research suggests that corporate governance reforms in the non-
financial sector may not be appropriate for banks and other financial sector firms.1  
This is based on the view that no single corporate governance structure is appropriate 
for all industry sectors, and that the application of governance models to particular 
industry sectors should take account of the institutional dynamics of the specific 
industry.  Corporate governance in the banking and financial sector differs from that 
in the non-financial sectors because of the broader risk that banks and financial firms 
pose to the economy.2  As a result, the regulator plays a more active role in 
establishing standards and rules to make management practices in banks more 
accountable and efficient.  Unlike other firms in the non-financial sector, a 
mismanaged bank may lead to a bank run or collapse, which can cause the bank to fail 
on its various counterparty obligations to other financial institutions and in providing 
liquidity to other sectors of the economy.3  The role of the board of directors therefore 
becomes crucial in balancing the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders (eg., 
creditors and depositors).  Consequently, bank regulators place additional 
responsibilities on bank boards that often result in detailed regulations regarding their 
decision-making practices and strategic aims.  These additional regulatory 
responsibilities for management have led some experts to observe that banking 
regulation is a substitute for corporate governance.4  According to this view, the 
regulator represents the public interest, including stakeholders, and can act more 
efficiently than most stakeholder groups in ensuring that the bank adheres to its 
regulatory and legal responsibilities.   
 
By contrast, other scholars argue that private remedies should be strengthened 
to enforce corporate governance standards at banks.5  Many propose improving 
banks’ accountability and efficiency of operations by increasing the legal duties that 
bank directors and senior management owe to depositors and other creditors. This 
would involve expanding the scope of fiduciary duties beyond shareholders to include 
depositors and creditors.6  Under this approach, depositors and other creditors could 
sue the board of directors for breach of fiduciary duties and the standard of care, in 
addition to whatever contractual claims they may have.  This would increase banks 
managers’ and directors’ incentive of bank managers and directors to pay more regard 
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to solvency risk and would thereby protect the broader economy from excessive risk-
taking.   
 
The traditional approach of corporate governance in the financial sector often 
involved the regulator or bank supervisor relying on statutory authority to devise 
governance standards promoting the interests of shareholders, depositors and other 
stakeholders.  In the United Kingdom, banking regulation has traditionally involved 
government regulators adopting standards and rules that were applied externally to 
regulated financial institutions.7  Regulatory powers were derived, in part, from the 
informal customary practices of the Bank of England and other bodies that exercised 
discretionary authority in their oversight of the UK banking industry.  In the United 
States, banking regulation has generally been shared between federal and state 
banking regulators.  The primary objective of US regulators was to maintain the 
safety and soundness of the banking system.  There were no specific criteria that 
defined what safety and soundness meant.  Regulators exercised broad discretionary 
authority to manage banks and to intervene in their operations if the regulator 
believed that they posed a threat to banking stability or to the US deposit insurance 
fund.  As US banking markets have become more integrated within the US as well as 
international in scope, US federal banking regulators increased their supervisory 
powers and developed more prescriptive and legalistic approaches of prudential 
regulation to ensure that US banks were well managed and governed.  Today, under 
both the UK and US approaches, the major objectives of bank regulation involve, 
inter alia, capital requirements, authorisation restrictions, ownership limitations, and 
restrictions on connected lending.8  These regulatory standards and rules compose the 
core elements of corporate governance for banking and credit institutions.   
 
As deregulation and liberalisation has led to the emergence of global financial 
markets, banks expanded their international operations and moved into multiple lines 
of financial business.  They developed complex risk management strategies that have 
allowed them to price financial products and hedge their risk exposures in a manner 
that improves expected profits, but which may generate more risk and increase 
liquidity problems in certain circumstances.9  The limited liability structure of most 
banks and financial firms, combined with the premium placed on shareholder profits, 
provides incentives for bank officers to undertake increasingly risky behaviour to 
achieve higher profits without a corresponding concern for the downside losses of 
risk.  Regulators and supervisors find it increasingly difficult to monitor the 
complicated internal operating systems of banks and financial firms.  This has made 
the external model of regulation less effective as a supervisory technique in 
addressing the increasing problems that the excessive risk-taking of financial firms 
poses to the broader economy.   
 
Increasingly, international standards of banking regulation are requiring 
domestic regulators to rely less on a strict application of external standards and more 
on internal monitoring strategies that involve the regulator working closely with 
banks and adjusting standards to suit the particular risk profile of individual banks.  
Indeed, Basel II emphasises that banks and financial firms should adopt, under the 
general supervision of the regulator, internal self-monitoring systems and processes 
that comply with statutory and regulatory standards.  This paper analyses recent 
developments in international banking regulation regarding the corporate governance 
of banks and financial institutions.  Specifically, it will review recent international 
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efforts with specific focus on the standards adopted by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision.  Pillar II of Basel II provides for supervisory review that allows 
regulators to use their discretion in applying regulatory standards.  This means that 
regulators have discretion to modify capital requirements depending on the risk 
profile of the bank in question.  Also, the regulator may require different internal 
governance frameworks for banks and to set controls on ownership and asset 
classifications.   
 
In the UK, the financial regulatory framework under the UK Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA)10  requires banks and other authorised 
financial firms to establish internal systems of control, compliance, and reporting for 
senior management and other key personnel.  Under FSMA, the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) has the power to review and sanction banks and financial firms 
regarding the types of internal control and compliance systems they adopt.11  These 
systems must be based on recognised principles and standards of good governance in 
the financial sector.  These regulatory standards place responsibility on the senior 
management of firms to establish and to maintain proper systems and controls, to 
oversee effectively the different aspects of the business, and to show that they have 
done so.12  The FSA will take disciplinary action if an approved person - director, 
senior manager or key personnel - deliberately violates regulatory standards or her 
behaviour falls below a standard that the FSA could reasonably expect to be 
observed.13   
 
The broader objective of the FSA’s regulatory approach is to balance the 
competing interests of shareholder wealth maximization and the interests of other 
stakeholders.14  The FSA’s balancing exercise relies less on the strict application of 
statutory codes and regulatory standards, and more on the design of flexible, internal 
compliance programmes that fit the particular risk-level and nature of the bank’s 
business.  To accomplish this, the FSA plays an active role with bank management in 
designing internal control systems and risk management practices that seek to achieve 
an optimal level of protection for shareholders, creditors, customers, and the broader 
economy.15  The regulator essentially steps into the shoes of these various stakeholder 
groups to assert stakeholder interests whilst ensuring that the bank’s governance 
practices do not undermine the broader goals of macroeconomic growth and financial 
stability.  The proactive role of the regulator is considered necessary because of the 
special risk that banks and financial firms pose to the broader economy.   
 
Part I of this paper considers “governance” within the context of the principal-
agent framework and how this applies to the risk-taking activities of financial sector 
firms.  Part II reviews some of the major international standards of corporate 
governance as they relate to banking and financial firms.  This involves a general 
discussion of the international norms of corporate governance for banking and 
financial institutions as set forth by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 
Part III analyses the FSMA regulatory regime for banking regulation and 
suggests that its requirements for banks and financial firms to establish internal 
systems of control and compliance programmes represents a significant change in UK 
banking supervisory techniques that establishes a new corporate governance 
framework for UK banks and financial firms.  This new regulatory framework departs 
from traditional UK company law by establishing an objective reasonable person 
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standard to assess whether senior managers and directors have complied with 
regulatory requirements, with the threat of substantial civil and criminal sanctions for 
breach.16  Part IV argues that this new regulatory framework for the corporate 
governance of banks promotes some of the core values in the corporate governance 
debate over transparency in governance structure and information flow, and the 
supervisor’s external, monitoring function.  Part V analyses the legal framework of 
US bank regulation and how it addresses corporate governance problems within banks 
and bank/financial holding companies.  Part VI concludes with some general 
comments and how the internal self-regulatory approach of UK bank regulators is 
becoming the predominant model in sophisticated financial markets and represents the 
trend in international standard setting, but questions still remain regarding the 
regulation of multi-national bank holding companies and the legal risks that arise 
from uncertainty in the meaning of certain banking statutes that call into question the 
discretion of regulator’s discretion to balance stakeholder interests and to exercise 
effective prudential oversight.     
 
I. Corporate Governance and Banking regulation   
A.   Why Banks Are Special? 
The role of banks is integral to any economy.  They provide financing for 
commercial enterprises, access to payment systems, and a variety of retail financial 
services for the economy at large.  Some banks have a broader impact on the macro 
sector of the economy, facilitating the transmission of monetary policy by making 
credit and liquidity available in difficult market conditions.17  The integral role that 
banks play in the national economy is demonstrated by the almost universal practice 
of states in regulating the banking industry and providing, in many cases, a 
government safety net to compensate depositors when banks fail.  Financial regulation 
is necessary because of the multiplier effect that banking activities have on the rest of 
the economy.  The large number of stakeholders (such as employees, customers, 
suppliers etc), whose economic well-being depends on the health of the banking 
industry, depend on appropriate regulatory practices and supervision.  Indeed, in a 
healthy banking system, the supervisors and regulators themselves are stakeholders 
acting on behalf of society at large.  Their primary function is to develop substantive 
standards and other risk management procedures for financial institutions in which 
regulatory risk measures correspond to the overall economic and operational risk 
faced by a bank.  Accordingly, it is imperative that financial regulators ensure that 
banking and other financial institutions have strong governance structures, especially 
in light of the pervasive changes in the nature and structure of both the banking 
industry and the regulation which governs its activities.  
B.   The Principal-Agent Problem 
The main characteristics of any governance problem is that the opportunity exists 
for some managers to improve their economic payoffs by engaging in unobserved, 
socially costly behaviour or “abuse” and the inferior information set of the outside 
monitors relative to the firm.18  These characteristics are related since abuse would not 
be unobserved if the monitor had complete information.  The basic idea – that 
managers have an information advantage and that this gives them the opportunity to 
take self-interested actions – is the standard principal-agent problem.19  The more 
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interesting issue is how this information asymmetry and the resulting inefficiencies 
affect governance within financial institutions. Does the manager have better 
information? Perhaps the best evidence that monitors possess inferior information 
relative to managers lies in the fact that monitors often employ incentive mechanisms 
rather than relying completely on explicit directives alone.20
Moreover, the principal-agent problem may also manifest itself within the context 
of the bank playing the role of external monitor over the activities of third parties to 
whom it grants loans.  In fact, when making loans, banks are concerned about two 
issues: the interest rate they receive on the loan, and the risk level of the loan.  The 
interest rate charged, however, has two effects.  First it sorts between potential 
borrowers (adverse selection)21 and it affects the actions of borrowers (moral 
hazard).22  These effects derive from the informational asymmetries present in the 
loan markets and hence the interest rate may not be the market-clearing price.23   
 
Adverse selection arises from different borrowers having different probabilities 
of repayment.  Therefore, to maximise expected return, the bank would like to only 
lend to borrowers with a high probability of repayment.  In order to determine who 
the good borrowers are, the bank can use the interest rate as a screening device.  
Unfortunately those who are willing to pay high interest rates may be bad borrowers 
because they perceive their probability of repayment to be low. Therefore, as interest 
rates rise, the average “riskiness” of borrowers increases, hence expected profits are 
lower.  The behaviour of the borrower is often a function of the interest rate.  At 
higher interest rates firms are induced to undertake projects with higher payoffs but, 
adversely for the bank, lower probabilities of success.  Moreover, an excess supply of 
credit could also be a problem.  If competitor banks try to tempt customers away from 
other banks with lower interest rates, they may succeed in only attracting bad 
borrowers – hence, they will not bother to do so. 
 
To avoid credit rationing, banks use other methods to screen potential 
borrowers.24  For example, banks can use extensive and comprehensive covenants on 
loans to mitigate agency costs.  As new information arrives, covenants can be 
renegotiated.  Covenants may also require collateral or personal guarantees from firms 
about their future activities and business practises in order to maximise the probability 
of repayment.  The banks lending history produces valuable information that evolves 
over time.  Banks therefore are depositories of information, which in itself becomes a 
valuable asset that allows banks to ascertain good borrowers from bad, and to price 
risk more efficiently by attracting good borrowers with lower interest rates and 
reducing the number of riskier borrowers.   
 
C.   Regulatory Intervention 
The foregoing illustrates the wide range of potential agency problems in financial 
institutions involving several major stakeholder groups including, but not limited to, 
shareholders, creditors/owners, depositors, management, and supervisory bodies. 
Agency problems arise because responsibility for decision-making is directly or 
indirectly delegated from one stakeholder group to another in situations where 
objectives between stakeholder groups differ and where complete information which 
would allow further control to be exerted over the decision maker is not readily 
available. One of the most studied agency problems in the case of financial 
institutions involves depositors and shareholders, or supervisors and shareholders. 
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While that perspective underpins the major features of the design of regulatory 
structures - capital adequacy requirements, deposit insurance, etc. - incentive 
problems that arise because of the conflicts between management and owners have 
become a focus of recent attention.25
The resulting view, that financial markets can be subject to inherent instability, 
induces governments to intervene to provide depositor protection in some form or 
other. Explicit deposit insurance is one approach, while an explicit or implicit deposit 
guarantee is another. In either case, general prudential supervision also occurs to limit 
the risk incurred by insurers or guarantors. To control the incentives of bank owners 
who rely too heavily on government funded deposit insurance, governments typically 
enforce some control over bank owners. These can involve limits on the range of 
activities; linking deposit insurance premiums to risk; and aligning capital adequacy 
requirements to business risk.26  
 
While such controls may overcome the agency problem between government and 
bank owners, it must be asked how significant this problem is in reality. A cursory 
review of recent banking crises would suggest that many causes for concern relate to 
management decisions which reflect agency problems involving management.  
Management may have different risk preferences from those of other stakeholders 
including the government, owners, creditors, etc., or limited competence in assessing 
the risks involved in its decisions, and yet have significant freedom of action because 
of the absence of adequate control systems able to resolve agency problems. 
 
Adequate corporate governance structures for banking institutions require 
internal control systems within banks to address the inherent asymmetries of 
information and the potential market failure that may result.  This form of market 
failure suggests a role for government intervention. If a central authority could know 
all agents’ private information and engage in lump-sum transfers between agents, then 
it could achieve a Pareto improvement. However, because a government cannot, in 
practice, observe agents’ private information, it can only achieve a constrained or 
second-best Pareto optimum. Reducing the costs associated with the principal-agent 
problem and thereby achieving a second-best solution depends to a large extent on the 
corporate governance structures of financial firms and institutions and the way 
information is disseminated in the capital markets.27   
 
The principal-agent problem, outlined above, poses a systemic threat to financial 
systems when the incentives of management for banking or securities firms are not 
aligned with those of the owners of the firm.  This may result in different risk 
preferences for management as compared to the firm’s owners, as well as other 
stakeholders, including creditors, employees, and the public.  The financial regulator 
represents the public’s interest in seeing that banks and securities firms are regulated 
efficiently so as to reduce systemic risk.  Many experts recognise the threat that 
market intermediaries and some investment firms pose to the systemic stability of 
financial systems.  In its report, the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) adopts internal corporate governance standards for investment 
firms to conduct themselves in a manner that protects their clients and the integrity 
and stability of financial markets.28  IOSCO places primary responsibility for the 
management and operation of securities firms on senior management.  
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II. International Standards of Corporate governance for banks and financial 
institutions  
 
A. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
The liberalization and deregulation of global financial markets led to efforts to 
devise international standards of financial regulation to govern the activities of 
international banks and financial institutions. An important part of this emerging 
international regulatory framework has been the development of international 
corporate-governance standards. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) has been at the forefront, establishing international norms of 
corporate governance that apply to both multinational firms and banking institutions. 
In 1999, the OECD issued a set of corporate governance standards and guidelines to 
assist governments in their efforts to evaluate and improve the legal, institutional, and 
regulatory framework for corporate governance in their countries.29 The OECD 
guidelines also provide standards and suggestions for “stock exchanges, investors, 
corporations, and other parties that have a role in the process of developing good 
corporate governance.”30 Such corporate-governance standards and structures are 
especially important for banking institutions that operate on a global basis. To this 
extent, the OECD principles may serve as a model for the governance structure of 
multinational financial institutions.  
 
In its most recent corporate governance report, the OECD emphasized the 
important role that banking and financial supervision plays in developing corporate-
governance standards for financial institutions.31 Consequently, banking supervisors 
have a strong interest in ensuring effective corporate governance at every banking 
organization. Supervisory experience underscores the necessity of having appropriate 
levels of accountability and managerial competence within each bank. Essentially, the 
effective supervision of the international banking system requires sound governance 
structures within each bank, especially with respect to multi-functional banks that 
operate on a transnational basis. A sound governance system can contribute to a 
collaborative working relationship between bank supervisors and bank management.  
 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee) has also 
addressed the issue of corporate governance of banks and multinational financial 
conglomerates, and has issued several reports addressing specific topics on corporate 
governance and banking activities.32 These reports set forth the essential strategies 
and techniques for the sound corporate governance of financial institutions, which can 
be summarized as follows:  
a. “[e]stablishing strategic objectives and a set of corporate values that are 
communicated throughout the banking organi[z]ation;”33 
b. “[s]etting and enforcing clear lines of responsibility and accountability 
throughout the organi[z]ation;”34  
c. “[e]nsuring that board members are qualified for their positions, have a clear 
understanding of their role in corporate governance and are not subject to 
undue influence from management or outside concerns;”35 
d. “[e]nsuring that there is appropriate oversight by senior management;”36 
e. “[e]ffectively utili[z]ing the work conducted by internal and external auditors, 
in recognition of the important control function they provide;”37 
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f. “[e]nsuring that compensation approaches are consistent with the bank’s 
ethical values, objectives, strategy and control environment;”38 and 
g. “[c]onducting corporate governance in a transparent manner.”39 
These standards recognize that senior management is an integral component of 
the corporate-governance process, while the board of directors provides checks and 
balances to senior managers, and that senior managers should assume the oversight 
role with respect to line managers in specific business areas and activities. The 
effectiveness of the audit process can be enhanced by recognizing the importance and 
independence of the auditors and requiring management’s timely correction of 
problems identified by auditors. The organizational structure of the board and 
management should be transparent, with clearly identifiable lines of communication 
and responsibility for decision-making and business areas. Moreover, there should be 
itemization of the nature and the extent of transactions with affiliates and related 
parties.40  
 
B. Basel II  
The Basel Committee adopted the Capital Accord in 1988 as a legally non-
binding international agreement among the world’s leading central banks and bank 
regulators to uphold minimum levels of capital adequacy for internationally-active 
banks.41 The New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II)42 contains the first detailed 
framework of rules and standards that supervisors can apply to the practices of senior 
management and the board for banking groups. Bank supervisors will now have the 
discretion to approve a variety of corporate-governance and risk-management 
activities for internal processes and decision-making, as well as substantive 
requirements for estimating capital adequacy and a disclosure framework for 
investors. For example, under Pillar One, the board and senior management have 
responsibility for overseeing and approving the capital rating and estimation 
processes.43 Senior management is expected to have a thorough understanding of the 
design and operation of the bank’s capital rating system and its evaluation of credit, 
market, and operational risks.44 Members of senior management will be expected to 
oversee any testing processes that evaluate the bank’s compliance with capital 
adequacy requirements and its overall control environment. Senior management and 
executive members of the board should be in a position to justify any material 
differences between established procedures set by regulation and actual practice.45 
Moreover, the reporting process to senior management should provide a detailed 
account of the bank’s internal ratings-based approach for determining capital 
adequacy.46  
 
Pillar One has been criticized as allowing large, sophisticated banks to use their 
own internal ratings methodologies for assessing credit and market risk to calculate 
their capital requirements.47 This approach relies primarily on historical data that may 
be subject to sophisticated applications that might not accurately reflect the bank’s 
true risk exposure, and it may also fail to take account of events that could not be 
foreseen by past data. Moreover, by allowing banks to use their own calculations to 
obtain regulatory capital levels, the capital can be criticized as being potentially 
incentive-incompatible.  
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Pillar Two seeks to address this problem by providing for both internal and 
external monitoring of the bank’s corporate governance and risk-management 
practices.48 Banks are required to monitor their assessments of financial risks and to 
apply capital charges in a way that most closely approximates the bank’s business-risk 
exposure.49 Significantly, the supervisor is now expected to play a proactive role in 
this process by reviewing and assessing the bank’s ability to monitor and comply with 
regulatory capital requirements. Supervisors and bank management are expected to 
engage in an ongoing dialogue regarding the most appropriate internal control 
processes and risk-assessment systems, which may vary between banks depending on 
their organizational structure, business practices, and domestic regulatory framework.  
 
Pillar Three also addresses corporate governance concerns by focusing on 
transparency and market-discipline mechanisms to improve the flow of information 
between bank management and investors.50 The goal is to align regulatory objectives 
with the bank’s incentives to make profits for its shareholders. Pillar Three seeks to 
do this by improving reporting requirements for bank capital adequacy. This covers 
both quantitative and qualitative disclosure requirements for both overall capital 
adequacy and capital allocation based on credit risk, market risk, operational risk, and 
interest rate risks.51  
 
Pillar Three sets forth important proposals to improve transparency by linking 
regulatory capital levels with the quality of disclosure.52 This means that banks will 
have incentives to improve their internal controls, systems operations, and overall 
risk-management practices if they improve the quality of the information regarding 
the bank’s risk exposure and management practices. Under this approach, 
shareholders would possess more and better information with which to make 
decisions about well-managed and poorly-managed banks. The downside of this 
approach is that, in countries with undeveloped accounting and corporate-governance 
frameworks, the disclosure of such information might lead to volatilities that might 
undermine financial stability by causing a bank run or failure that might not have 
otherwise occurred had the information been disclosed in a more sensitive manner. 
Pillar Three has not yet provided a useful framework for regulators and bank 
management to coordinate their efforts in the release of information that might create 
a volatile response in the market.  
 
Although the Basel Committee has recognized that “primary responsibility for 
good corporate governance rests with boards of directors and senior management of 
banks,”53 its 1999 report on corporate governance suggested other ways to promote 
corporate governance, including laws and regulations; disclosure and listing 
requirements by securities regulators and stock exchanges; sound accounting and 
auditing standards as a basis for communicating to the board and senior management; 
and voluntary adoption of industry principles by banking associations that agree on 
the publication of sound practices.54  
 
In this respect, the role of legal issues is crucial for determining ways to improve 
corporate governance for financial institutions. There are several ways to help 
promote strong businesses and legal environments that support corporate governance 
and related supervisory activities. These include enforcing contracts, including those 
with service providers; clarifying supervisors’ and senior management’s governance 
roles; ensuring that corporations operate in an environment free from corruption and 
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bribery; and aligning laws, regulations, and other measures with the interests of 
managers, employees, and shareholders. 
 
These principles of corporate governance for financial institutions, as set forth by 
the OECD and the Basel Committee, have been influential in determining the shape 
and evolution of corporate-governance standards in many advanced economies and 
developing countries and, in particular, have been influential in establishing internal 
control systems and risk-management frameworks for banks and financial institutions. 
These standards of corporate governance are likely to become international in scope 
and to be implemented into the regulatory practices of the leading industrial states. 
 
The globalization of financial markets necessitates minimum international 
standards of corporate governance for financial institutions that can be transmitted 
into financial systems in a way that will reduce systemic risk and enhance the 
integrity of financial markets. It should be noted, however, that international standards 
of corporate governance may result in different types and levels of systemic risk for 
different jurisdictions due to differences in business customs and practices and the 
differences in institutional and legal structures of national markets. Therefore, the 
adoption of international standards and principles of corporate governance should be 
accompanied by domestic regulations that prescribe specific rules and procedures for 
the governance of financial institutions, which address the national differences in 
political, economic, and legal systems. 
 
Although international standards of corporate governance should respect diverse 
economic and legal systems, the overriding objective for all financial regulators is to 
encourage banks to devise regulatory controls and compliance programs that require 
senior bank management and directors to adopt good regulatory practices 
approximating the economic risk exposure of the financial institution. Because 
different national markets must protect against different types of economic risk, there 
are no universally correct answers accounting for differences in financial markets, and 
laws need not be uniform from country to country. Recognizing this, sound 
governance practices for banking organizations can take place according to different 
forms that suit the economic and legal structure of a particular jurisdiction. 
 
Nevertheless, the organizational structure of any bank or securities firm should 
include four forms of oversight: (1) oversight by the board of directors or supervisory 
board; (2) oversight by nonexecutive individuals who are not involved in the day-to-
day management of the business; (3) oversight by direct line supervision of different 
business areas; and (4) oversight by independent risk management and audit 
functions. Regulators should also utilize approximate criteria to ensure that key 
personnel meet fit and proper standards. These principles should also apply to 
government-owned banks, but with the recognition that government ownership may 
often mean different strategies and objectives for the bank. 
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III. UK FINANCIAL REGULATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE 
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY REGIME  
A.   Corporate Governance and Company Law – Recent Developments 
 
The Combined Code of Corporate Governance 
 
This section reviews recent developments in UK corporate governance and 
discusses the relevant aspects of UK company law.  The boards of directors of UK 
companies traditionally have had two functions -  to lead and to control the company.  
Shareholders, directors and auditors have had a role to play in ensuring good 
corporate governance.  In the 1990s, reform of corporate governance at UK 
companies became a major issue of concern for shareholders as well as policymakers.  
This was precipitated by a number of serious financial scandals involving major UK 
banks and financial institutions.55   
 
In May 1991, a committee chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury was established to 
make recommendations to improve corporate control mechanisms not only for banks 
but also for all UK companies.56  The Cadbury Committee’s main focus was on 
financial control mechanisms and the responsibilities of the Board of Directors, the 
auditor, and shareholders.57  The Committee published a final report in 1992, which 
concluded that the cause of these problems were not the need for improved auditing 
and accounting standards, but widespread defects in the internal control systems of 
large UK companies.58  In the report, the Committee defined corporate governance  
‘as the system by which companies are directed and controlled’.59  Moreover, the 
Committee recommended that the boards of all listed companies registered in the UK 
should comply with the Code immediately or explain why they have not complied.60     
 
In recent years, UK corporate governance has been greatly influenced by the 
corporate and financial scandals in the United States, and by the broader framework 
of reforms being undertaken in the European Community.61  As a result, a revised 
Combined Code came into effect on 1 November 2003, based on proposals of the 
Financial Reporting Council.62  The revision incorporated proposals of the Higgs 
Review63 regarding the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors and the 
proposals of Sir Robert Smith’s report64 on audit committees.65 The Code was 
amended to reflect proposals in the Higgs review that a change in board structure 
should be based on two principles: (1) enhancing the role of non-executive directors, 
and (2) splitting the role of the CEO and board chairman.66  The chairman should be 
an independent, non-executive director who can take a detached view of the 
company’s affairs.  Another important proposal of the Higgs Review was that 
independent, non-executive directors should be used more to transmit the views of 
shareholders to the Board.67  In this way, non-executives would have more 
responsibility to monitor the performance of the company’s executive directors. 
 
The FSA now considers compliance with the Code to be an important issue for 
investor consideration.68  Although the Combined Code is technically voluntary in a 
legal sense, public companies listed on the London Stock Exchange and other 
regulated exchanges are required to state in their annual reports whether they comply 
with the Code and must provide an explanation if they do not comply.69  This is 
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known as the ‘Comply or explain principle’.70  The requirement to comply or explain 
does not apply to non-listed companies.71  
  
In 2003-2004, the FSA undertook a review of corporate governance and the 
regulation of the capital markets that seeks to examine the following issues: the 
interaction of the Combined Code with the listing rules; the conflicts of interests that 
can arise when directors serve on several different boards; and the value of applying 
the FSA’s Model Code on financial regulation to the corporate governance practices 
of publicly listed companies.  Moreover, regarding financial institutions, the FSA 
recognises that corporate governance standards and practices must be devised with 
broader systemic issues in mind, which requires the regulator to take a more proactive 
role balancing shareholder and other stakeholder interests. 
 
 As mentioned above, the combined code is not a legal requirement under UK 
financial regulation.  For example, it is not part of the FSA’s banking regulation 
regime or the Listing Rules for the capital markets.  It has therefore not been subject 
to FSA investigations and enforcement.72  It should be recalled that the Cadbury 
Report recommended that the combined code be applicable to all companies – listed 
and unlisted.73  The UK Government has taken this a step further by proposing in its 
White Paper, entitled Modernising Company Law, that the combined code should be 
legally obligatory and enforced by a new Standards Board.74   
 
B. English Company Law and Directors’ Duties 
 
Unlike United States corporation law, company law in the UK has 
traditionally provided that directors owe a duty to the company, not to the 
shareholders.75  This legal principle provides a point of departure for analysing the 
regulator’s role in devising corporate governance standards that seek to balance the 
various interests of shareholders, creditors and stakeholders.  The UK Companies Act 
198576 provides the legal mechanism to ensure that UK companies are managed and 
operated in the interests of shareholders.  The board of directors has sole 
responsibility for setting and controlling the company’s internal governance system, 
whilst the main external governance system is the market for corporate control.77   As 
discussed above, most of the provisions of the Combined Code are not legally binding 
and form a type soft law in the regulation of companies.  Nevertheless, the Companies 
Act and the Combined Code together form a comprehensive framework for ensuring 
that private and public UK companies are managed for the benefit of shareholders.   
 
Although the traditional model of UK corporate governance focuses on 
shareholder wealth maximisation, it should be noted that English company law has 
traditionally stated that directors owe a duty to the company, not to individual 
shareholders.78  This position has been interpreted as meaning that directors owe 
duties of care and fiduciary duties directly to the shareholders collectively in the form 
of the company, and not to the shareholders individually.79   
 
The starting point of analysis for this area of the law is the case of Percival v 
Wright,80 in which the court held that directors of a company are not trustees for 
individual shareholders and may purchase their shares without disclosing pending 
negotiations for the sale of the company.81  In essence, a director owes duties to the 
company and not to individual shareholders.82  However, a director who does disclose 
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certain information to shareholders has a duty not to mislead the shareholders with 
respect to that information.83  The rule in Percival v Wright has been subject to 
substantial criticism by various UK government committees, including the Cohen 
Committee84 and the Jenkins Committee.85  The law has now evolved to a point where 
the courts recognise that a fiduciary duty may be owed by directors to individual 
shareholders in special circumstances, such as where the company is a family-run 
business.86   
 
Therefore, under English law, barring special circumstances or regulatory 
intervention, company directors owe their duty to the legal person - the ‘company’-  
rather than to shareholders or to potential shareholders.87  Although the UK company 
law model is based on the notion of the shareholder ‘city state’,88 the directors owe 
their fiduciary duties directly to the company, and only indirectly to the 
shareholders.89  It is difficult, however, to separate the interests of the company from 
those of the shareholders.  Indeed, the interests of the company are in an economic 
and legal sense the interests of the shareholders, which can be divided further into the 
interests of the present and future shareholders including a balance between the 
interests of the various shareholder classes.  Therefore, discretionary exercise of the 
directors’ duties must be directed toward the maximisation of those shareholder 
interests - that is, to maximise profits.  The technical legal duty, however, is to the 
company, not the shareholders. 
 
 The principle that the director’s duty is owed to the company raises important 
issues regarding how the interests of the company should be defined.  Is the company 
merely an aggregate of the interests of the shareholders? Or does the company itself 
encompass a broader measure of interests that includes not only the shareholders’ 
interests, but also the interests of other so-called ‘stakeholders’?  The general view of 
the English courts in interpreting the Companies Act 1985 is that a director’s legal 
duties are owed to the company and that the company’s interest are defined primarily 
in terms of what benefits the shareholders.  UK corporate governance standards, as set 
forth in the Combined Code, reinforce this position by holding that shareholder 
wealth maximisation is the main criteria for determining the successful stewardship of 
a company.90    
 
In the case of bank directors, English courts have addressed senior 
management’s and directors’ duties and responsibilities over the affairs of a bank.  
The classic statement of directors’ duties regarding a bank was in the Marquis of 
Bute’s Case,91 which involved the Marquis of Bute, who had inherited the office of 
president of the Cardiff Savings Bank when he was six months old.92  Over the next 
thirty eight years, he attended only one board meeting of the bank before he was sued 
for negligence in failing to keep himself informed about the bank’s reckless lending 
activities.  The judge rejected the liability claim on the grounds that, as a director, the 
Marquis knew nothing about the affairs of the bank and furthermore had no duty to 
keep himself informed of the bank’s affairs.93  In reaching its decision, the court did 
not apply a reasonable person standard to determine whether the Marquis should have 
kept himself informed about the bank’s activities.   
 
This case appeared to stand for the proposition that a ‘reasonable person’ test 
would not be applied to acts or omissions of a director or senior manager who had 
failed to keep himself informed of the bank or company’s activities.  In subsequent 
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cases, the courts were reluctant to apply such a lenient liability standard.  In Dovey v. 
Corvey94 a third party brought an action in negligence against a company director for 
malpractice and the court applied a reasonable person standard in finding the director 
not liable.95  The court found that the director had not acted negligently in receiving 
suspicious information from other company officers and in failing to investigate 
further any irregularities in company practice.96  The significance of the case, 
however, was that the court recognised that a reasonable person test should be applied 
to determine whether a director had breached its duty of care and skill.  But the 
reasonable person test would not be that of a ‘reasonable professional director’ – 
rather, it would be that of a reasonable man who had possessed the particular ability 
and skills of the actual defendant in the case.97  In Marquis of Bute’s case, it would 
not be difficult to show that the defendant did not possess the requisite skills at hand 
to make an informed judgment.98  On the other hand, it would be easier to do so 
regarding an experienced and skilled senior manager who had failed to act on 
information that was of direct relevance to the company’s operations.   
 
 The courts have developed this reasonable person standard in several cases, 99 
the most recent of which is Dorchester Finance Co., Ltd. v. Stebbing,100 where the 
court found that the reasonable person test should apply equally to both executive and 
non-executive directors.  More generally, modern English company law would set 
forth three important standards regarding the duty of care and skill for directors.  First, 
a director is not required to demonstrate a degree of skill that would exceed what 
would normally be expected of a person with the director’s actual level of skill and 
knowledge.101  Second, a director is not required to concern herself on a continuous 
basis with the affairs of the company, as his or her involvement will be periodic and 
will be focused mainly at board meetings and at other meetings at which he or she is 
in attendance, and he or she is not required to attend all meetings, nor to be liable for 
decisions that are made in his or her absence.102  Third, a director may properly rely 
on company officers to perform any day-to-day affairs of the business while not being 
liable for any wrongdoing of those officers in the absence of grounds for suspicion.103  
Notwithstanding the courts’ efforts to define further the reasonable person standard 
for company directors, it can be criticised on the grounds that it may create a 
disincentive, in the absence of regulatory standards, for skilled persons to serve as 
directors, especially for financial companies that often require more technical 
supervisory skills in the boardroom.    
 
 Regarding fiduciary duties, English company directors have the paramount 
duty of acting bona fide in the interest of the company.  Specifically, this means the 
director individually owes a duty of good faith to the company, which means the 
director is a fiduciary of the company’s interest.  Although the director’s fiduciary 
duties resemble the duties of a trustee, they are not the same.104  The fiduciary duties 
of directors have been set forth in the Companies Act and fall into the following 
categories: the directors may act only within the course and scope of duties conferred 
upon them by the company memorandum or articles,105 and they must act in good 
faith in respect to the best interest of the company, while not allowing their discretion 
to be limited in the decisions they make for the company.106  Moreover, a director 
who finds himself or herself in the position of having a conflict of interest will be 
required to take corrective measures.107   
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 C. The Financial Services and Markets Act: The Statutory Framework 
The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA)108 and its accompanying 
regulations create a regime founded on a risk-based approach to the regulation of all 
financial business. FSMA’s stated statutory objectives are to maintain confidence in 
the financial system, to promote public awareness, to provide “appropriate” consumer 
protection, and to reduce financial crime.109 FSMA incorporates and simplifies the 
various regulatory approaches utilized under the Financial Services Act of 1986, in 
which self-regulatory organizations were delegated authority to regulate and to 
supervise the financial services industry.110 FSMA created the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) as a single regulator of the financial services industry with 
responsibility, inter alia, for banking supervision and regulation of the investment 
services and insurance industries. 111
 
To achieve these objectives, the FSA has been delegated legislative authority to 
adopt rules and standards to ensure that the statutory objectives are implemented and 
enforced.112 In so doing, the FSA must have regard to seven principles, which include 
“the desirability of facilitating innovation in connection with regulated activities;” 
“the need to minimi[z]e the adverse effects on competition that may arise from 
anything done in the discharge of those functions;” and “the desirability of facilitating 
competition between those who are subject to any form of regulation by the 
Authority.”113  
 
The FSA has established a regulatory regime that emphasizes ex ante 
preventative strategies, including front-end intervention when market participants are 
suspected of not complying with their obligations. Under the FSMA framework, 
regulatory resources are redirected away from reactive, post-event intervention 
towards a more proactive stance emphasizing the use of regulatory investigations and 
enforcement actions, which have the overall objective of achieving market confidence 
and investor and consumer protection. In devising regulations, the FSA is required to 
conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the regulations’ impact on financial markets.114 
Although many leading economists have criticized the use of cost-benefit analysis,115 
the FSA has adopted a comprehensive framework for such assessments. It has 
published its internal guidance, which allows market participants and the investing 
public to gain a better understanding of the basis on which regulations are adopted. In 
addition, FSMA provides for a single authorization process and a new market abuse 
offense116 that imposes civil liability, fines, and penalties for the misuse of inside 
information and market manipulation.117  
 
The FSMA sets out a framework to protect the integrity of nine of the UK’s 
recognized investment exchanges, including the London Stock Exchange, the London 
Metal Exchange, and the London International Financial Futures Exchange.118 The 
FSA has the power to scrutinize the rules and practices of firms and exchanges for 
anti-competitive effects. Moreover, the FSA has exercised its statutory authority to 
create an ombudsman and compensation scheme for consumers and investors who 
have complaints against financial services providers for misconduct in the sale of 
financial products.119  
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The FSA’s main functions will be forming policy and setting regulation standards 
and rules (including the authorization of firms); approval and registration of senior 
management and key personnel; investigation, enforcement and discipline; consumer 
relations; and banking and financial supervision. The FSMA requires the FSA to 
adopt a flexible and differentiated risk-based approach to setting standards and 
supervising banks and financial firms. The FSA has authority to enter into 
negotiations with foreign regulators and governments regarding a host of issues, 
including agreements for the exchange of information, coordinating implementation 
of EU and international standards, and cross-border enforcement and surveillance of 
transnational financial institutions. 
 
In pursuit of these aims, the FSA has signed a number of memoranda of 
understanding (MOUs) and mutual assistance treaties with foreign authorities that 
provide for co-operation and information-sharing.120 The FSA, the UK Treasury, and 
the Bank of England signed a domestic MOU providing a general division of 
responsibilities in which the Treasury maintains overall responsibility for policy and 
the adoption of statutory instruments, while the FSA has primary responsibility for the 
supervision and regulation of all financial business, and the Bank of England conducts 
monetary policy and surveillance of international financial markets.121
D. The FSA’s Corporate Governance Regime  
A major consequence of FSMA is its direct impact on corporate-governance 
standards for UK financial firms through its requirement of high standards of conduct 
for senior managers and key personnel of regulated financial institutions. The main 
idea is based on the belief that transparency of information is integrally related to 
accountability in that it can provide government supervisors, bank owners, creditors, 
and other market participants sufficient information and incentive to assess a bank’s 
management. To this end, the FSA has adopted comprehensive regulations that create 
civil liability for senior managers and directors for breaches by their firms, even if 
they had no direct knowledge or involvement in the breach or violation itself. For 
example, if the regulator finds that a firm has breached rules because of the actions of 
a rogue employee who has conducted unauthorized trades or stolen client money, the 
regulator may take action against senior management for failing to have adequate 
procedures in place to prevent this from happening. 
1. High-Level Principles  
The FSA has incorporated the eleven high-level principles of business that were 
part of previous UK financial services legislation.122 They applied to all persons and 
firms in the UK financial services industry. These principles also apply to senior 
management and directors of UK financial firms. The most widely invoked of these 
principles are integrity; skill, care, and diligence; management and control; financial 
prudence; market conduct; conflicts of interests; and relations with regulators. FSA 
regulations often cite these principles as a policy basis justifying new regulatory rules 
and standards for the financial sector. These principles are also used as a basis to 
evaluate the suitability of applicants to become approved persons to carry on financial 
business in the UK.  
 
Principle Two states that “[a] firm must conduct its business with due skill, care 
and diligence.”123 The FSA interprets this principle as setting forth an objective, 
reasonable person standard for all persons involved in the management and direction 
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of authorized financial firms.124 The reasonable person standard also applies to 
Principle Nine, which provides a basic framework for internal standards of corporate 
governance by requiring that a financial firm “organi[z]e and control its internal 
affairs in a responsible manner.”125 Regarding employees or agents, the firm “should 
have adequate arrangements to ensure that they are suitable, adequately trained and 
properly supervised and that it has well-defined compliance procedures.”126
 
In addition, the FSA has adopted its own statement of principles for all approved 
persons, which includes integrity in carrying out functions,127 acting with due skill 
and care in carrying out a controlled function,128 observing proper standards of market 
conduct,129 and dealing with the regulator in an open and honest way.130 The FSA has 
also adopted additional principles that apply directly to senior managers and require 
them to take reasonable steps to ensure that the regulated business of their firm is 
organized so that it can be controlled effectively.131 The objective, reasonable person 
test is reinforced in Principle Six with the requirement that senior managers “exercise 
due skill, care and diligence in managing the [regulated] business” of their firm.132 
Additionally, senior managers must take reasonable steps to ensure that the regulated 
business of their firm complies with all applicable requirements.133 These high-level 
principles demonstrate that an objective regulatory standard of care exists to govern 
the actions of senior managers and directors in their supervision and oversight of the 
banking firm. 
2. Authorisation 
FSMA Section 56 provides the legal basis for authorizing financial firms and 
individuals.134 Based on this authority, the FSA provides a single authorization regime 
for all firms and approved individuals who exercise controlled functions in the 
financial services industry. The FSA can impose a single prohibition on anyone who 
is not an authorized or exempt person from carrying on regulated activities.135 Any 
person who does so can be subject to civil fines and may be adjudicated guilty of a 
criminal offense.136 The FSA takes the view that its authorization process is a 
fundamental part of its risk-based approach to regulation.  
 
The FSA discharges its function by scrutinizing, at entry level, firms and 
individuals who satisfy the necessary criteria (including honesty, competence, and 
financial soundness) to engage in regulated activity. The authorization process of the 
FSA regulations seeks to prevent most regulatory problems by maintaining a thorough 
vetting system for those seeking licenses to operate or work in the financial sector.137 
The FSA has discretionary authority to exercise its powers in any way that it 
“considers most appropriate for the purpose of meeting [its regulatory] objectives.”138
 
The FSA will take three factors into account when determining fitness and 
propriety in the authorization process. First, it must make a determination that the 
applicant is honest in its dealings with consumers, professional market participants, 
and regulators.139 This is known as the “honesty, integrity, and reputation” 
requirement. Second, the FSA requires the applicant to have competence and 
capability—that is, the necessary skills to fulfill the functions that are assigned or 
expected.140 Third, an applicant must be able to demonstrate financial soundness.141 
These are objective standards that must be fulfilled to engage in the banking or 
financial business.  
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In addition, a firm or an individual applying for authorization must submit a 
business plan detailing its intended activities, with a level of detail appropriate for the 
level of risks.142 The FSA will determine whether employees, the company board, and 
the firm itself meet the minimum requirements set out in the Act. It is a core function 
of the FSA authorization process that the regulator satisfy itself that the applicants and 
their employees are capable of identifying, managing, and controlling various 
financial risks and can perform effectively the risk-management functions. 
3. Senior Management Arrangements, Systems, and Controls 
The FSMA aims to regulate the activities of individuals who exert significant 
influence on the conduct of a firm’s affairs in relation to its regulated activities. 
Pursuant to this authority, the FSA has divided these individuals into two groups: 
(1) members of governing bodies of firms, such as directors, members of managing 
groups of partners, and management committees, who have responsibility for setting 
the firm’s business strategy, regulatory climate, and ethical standards; and 
(2) members of senior management to whom the firm’s governing body has made 
significant delegation of controlled functions.143 Controlled functions include, inter 
alia, internal audits, risk management, leadership of significant business units, and 
compliance responsibilities.144 The delegation of controlled functions likely would 
occur in a number of contexts, but would occur particularly in companies that are part 
of complex financial groups.  
 
The FSA is required to regulate in a way that recognizes senior managements’ 
responsibility to manage firms and to ensure the firms’ compliance with regulatory 
requirements. FSA regulations are designed to reinforce effective senior management 
and internal systems of control. At a fundamental level, firms are required to “take 
reasonable care to establish and maintain such systems and controls as are appropriate 
to [their] business.”145 The FSA requires senior management to play the main role in 
ensuring that effective governance structures are in place, overseeing the operation of 
systems and controls, and maintaining strong standards of accountability.146  
 
More specifically, the FSA requires firms to take reasonable care to establish and 
maintain an appropriate apportionment of responsibilities among directors and senior 
managers in a way that makes their responsibilities clear.147 They also are required to 
take reasonable care to ensure that internal governance systems are appropriate to the 
scale, nature, and complexity of the firm’s business.148 This reasonable care standard 
also applies to the board of directors and corporate officers who must exercise the 
necessary skill and care to ensure that effective systems and controls for compliance 
are in place. Unlike the reasonable care standard at common law, the reasonable care 
standard in the FSA regulations is an objective standard that expects corporate 
officers and board members to comply with a certain skill level when exercising their 
functions. It will not be a defense for them merely to claim ignorance or lack of 
expertise if they fail to live up to the objective standard of care that requires them to 
establish and to maintain systems and controls appropriate to the scale, nature, and 
complexity of the business.149
 
Furthermore, a company’s most senior executives, alone or with other senior 
executives from different companies in the same corporate group, are required to 
apportion senior management responsibilities according to function and capability, 
and to oversee the establishment and maintenance of the firm’s systems and 
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controls.150 Corporate officers’ and directors’ failure to act reasonably in apportioning 
responsibilities may result in substantial civil sanctions and, in some cases, restitution 
orders to shareholders for any losses arising from these breaches of duty.151 In 
addition to shareholders’ private remedies for restitution, the FSA may impose 
additional and unlimited civil sanctions and penalties on individuals who are officers 
or directors in an amount that the FSA deems appropriate, even though the individuals 
in question may not have been involved directly in the offense in question.152 The 
decision to impose personal liability can arise from the senior manager’s failure to 
comply with the objective standard of care.  
 
The FSA regulations for internal systems and controls address the problem, 
which existed at common law and in the Companies Act, of requiring only a 
subjective, reasonable person test to determine whether a board member met his or 
her duty of care and skill. Firms and their senior managers and officers are now 
required to comply with a heightened objective standard set by the FSA through its 
authorization process or enforcement rules. For example, if a senior manager has 
exercised a controlled function in violation of the regulatory rules, and the FSA finds 
the manager to be in contravention of his or her legal obligations, the FSA may 
impose “a penalty, in respect of the contravention, of such amount as it considers 
appropriate.”153
 
The regulations seek to ensure that the firm’s system and control requirements 
will be proportionate to the size and nature of the firm’s business. Moreover, 
corporate officers and directors of a bank or financial firm also have the responsibility 
to ensure that compliance with these systems and controls is linked in a meaningful 
way to the authorization process. 
E. Corporate Governance and the UK Anti-Money Laundering Rules  
FSMA’s statutory objective to reduce financial crime has involved the FSA 
writing a comprehensive set of regulations for banks, financial services firms, and 
their advisors to undertake due diligence and know the customer reporting 
requirements, and to undertake other safeguards against financial crime in financial 
institutions.154 Statutory anti-money-laundering requirements for financial firms were 
first adopted under the Money Laundering Regulations of 1993.155 Section 146 of the 
FSMA authorizes the FSA to “make rules in relation to the prevention and detection 
of money laundering in connection with the carrying on of regulated activities by 
authori[z]ed persons.”156 Based on this power, the FSA has adopted specific rules to 
target money laundering and terrorist financing.157  
 
The FSA Money Laundering Rules create an objective, reasonable person 
standard against which the activities of senior management and directors will be 
measured for the purpose of imposing civil and criminal sanctions for violations of 
the rules. For instance, the FSA rules require all UK financial institutions to,  
take reasonable care to establish and maintain effective systems and controls 
for compliance with applicable requirements and standards under the 
regulatory system and for countering the risk that the firm might be used to 
further financial crime.158
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Moreover, an authorized firm must take reasonable steps to determine the identity 
of its client by obtaining sufficient evidence of the identity of any client who comes 
into contact with the firm.159
 
The FSA Money Laundering Rules require firms to have in place adequate anti-
money-laundering controls and compliance programs. The FSA requires each 
authorized firm to have in place a self-certification program for anti-money-
laundering compliance.160 Senior management and directors are required to take 
responsibility for the firm’s internal controls and compliance systems. Compliance 
monitoring and providing key information to the relevant compliance officer are 
major responsibilities of senior management.161
 
Regulated financial institutions are required to appoint a money laundering 
reporting officer (MLRO), who must be approved by the FSA.162 The MLRO must 
issue a detailed annual report to assess whether the financial institution has complied 
with the FSA Money Laundering Rules.163 Banks and financial institutions must also 
make and retain records, including evidence of identity, details of transactions, and 
details of internal and external reports.164  
 
The FSA has undertaken a number of enforcement actions to enforce these 
standards and to impose sanctions on senior managers for failing to act reasonably in 
maintaining internal controls and reporting wrongdoing by lower level employees.  In 
the Credit Suisse Financial Products case,165 the FSA disciplined three senior 
managers of Credit Suisse Financial Products (CSFP, now Credit Suisse First 
Boston).  Two were disciplined for inappropriate conduct and the other one (the 
former chief executive) was disciplined for failing to implement the appropriate 
system of internal controls.166  The FSA imposed a fine of £150,000 on the former 
CEO for failing to detect or prevent attempts to mislead the Japanese tax authorities in 
an audit of the firm’s Japanese operations.   
 
Although the FSA found that the CEO had properly delegated responsibility for 
complying with the firm’s audit to other managers who had failed to execute their 
delegated function, it held nonetheless that the CEO was liable and thus subject to 
sanctions.  Specifically, the FSA held that the CEO had failed to monitor and 
supervise staff, and to discern and investigate and to take preventative measures after 
it became apparent that the firm’s employees were engaged in illegal conduct under 
Japanese law.167  The FSA’s case rested on the fact that the CEO had received 
documents that would have provided him with the necessary information to discover 
the employees’ misconduct had he read the documents.  By failing to read the 
documents the CEO had violated the reasonable person standard for a person in his 
position, which prevented him from becoming aware of the misconduct which he 
agreed was inappropriate and illegal.  The enforcement action shows how the FSA 
might act under the FSMA regime were a senior manager to breach the reasonable 
expectations of the FSA regulatory standards.  Moreover, the case reveals the 
extraterritorial extent of the FSA’s regulatory regime and how it can impose civil 
sanctions on financial market professionals for misconduct that takes place in other 
jurisdictions.   
 
In summary, the FSMA regulatory model emphasises the role of the regulator in 
representing stakeholder interests and in seeking to achieve the overall public interest 
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of economic growth and a safe and sound banking system.  UK financial regulation 
provides a more comprehensive framework of corporate governance that recognises 
the important role played by the regulator in representing broader stakeholder 
interests, including creditors, depositors and customers.  Furthermore, the regulator 
seeks to promote the broader public and stakeholder interest by effectively enforcing 
regulatory standards in a manner that will deter misconduct and induce management 
to undertake efficient behaviour that promotes overall macroeconomic growth and 
stability.  A particular aspect of UK bank regulation involves its recognition of the 
relationship between the internal governance framework of banks and the incentive 
structure for risk-taking. 
 
V.   Corporate Governance and US Banking Regulation: Prudential Standards   
 
The United States has traditionally had a federal-state structure for banking 
regulation.  Federal and state regulators shared responsibility for ensuring the 
prudential soundness of US banks.  Before the 1980s, it was not necessary for a 
foreign bank to obtain approval from a US federal regulator to operate as a bank in a 
US state so long as the foreign bank had obtained permission from the relevant state 
bank regulator.  This federal structure of banking regulation began to evolve in the 
1970s in response to dramatic changes in global financial markets.  Increasing 
liberalisation and deregulation in global and US banking markets had exposed US 
banks to more volatility in the wholesale banking market, which led to increased 
systemic risk in the payment system and the likelihood of bank failures that could 
have a domino-like effect throughout the banking sector.  In the late 1970s and 1980s, 
Congress responded by enacting legislation that delegated broad authority to federal 
bank regulators to supervise and control the activities of all banks operating in the US 
- whether they were US or foreign, or seeking federal or state licenses.  
 
US banks and bank/financial holding companies are governed by a 
comprehensive system of statutory regulation that generally provides regulators with 
broad discretion to take measures to promote safety and soundness in the banking 
system, protect the deposit insurance fund, and promote competition in the banking 
sector.  Because these regulatory objectives often conflict, and the legal powers 
delegated to regulators by Congress are broad, the US courts have been called upon in 
a number of cases to resolve disputes between regulators and bank management 
regarding the scope of the regulator’s authority to adopt measures to regulate banking 
institutions.  In the case of bank/financial holding companies, US courts have 
interpreted the bank holding company statutes narrowly as not authorising the Federal 
Reserve to issue regulatory directives against holding companies except when they 
apply to acquire, or merge with, banks.   
 
This section argues that since the 1970s liberalisation and deregulation in the 
US banking sector has created substantial systemic risk that has led US regulators and 
courts to play a more interventionist role in the oversight of banking institutions.  It 
assesses the legal framework for regulating moral hazard in the US despoit insurance 
system.  It then examines recent judicial rulings concerning the authority of the 
Federal Reserve Board to impose source of strength requirements on bank holding 
companies and their banks. It argues that these decisions have exposed institutional 
gaps in the federal structure of US banking regulation and have undermined corporate 
governance in bank and financial holding companies.           
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US prudential regulation  
 
The concept of prudential regulation in US banking law grew out of the vague 
statutory requirement that banks should be managed and operated in a safe and sound 
manner.  The ‘safety and soundness’ principle has been the driving force in US 
banking regulation and corporate governance practices.  It should not be forgotten that 
the ‘soundness’ principle was derived from the supervisory practices of the Bank of 
England which emphasised the need for fit and proper standards for senior managers 
and directors of banks.  In both the US and UK, the soundness principle and 
prudential regulatory standards provided the basis for the development of standards 
and principles of corporate governance for banking institutions.  Effective corporate 
governance principles were considered essential to preserve financial stability by 
regulating management practices of banks so that conflicts of interest and self-dealing 
was minimised.  Moreover, US regulation has also set strict standards for the auditors 
and accountants of banking institutions with the potential for civil and criminal 
liability for failing to report accurately the financial condition of banks and other 
regulated financial institutions.  Under UK and US regulation, it has been recognised 
that the integral role that banks play in the economy and the liquidity problems they 
face are due to the mismatch between the bank’s liabilities and its assets.  This 
mismatch creates a negative externality that is a social cost that must be minimised 
through effective regulation.  An important aspect of US banking regulation has been 
the governance practices of banks and financial institutions.   
 
An important area that has not been adequately regulated by either the US or 
UK is the financial incentives provided by banks to their employees and shareholders.  
Indeed, the risk-taking strategies of senior management and directors are significantly 
influenced by their compensation arrangements and by their exposure to civil and 
criminal liability for their risk-taking practices.  The goal, as discussed in section I, is 
to align their incentives with the incentives of shareholders, depositors and creditors.  
In other words, they must be required to incur the costs of their risk-taking activities.  
The regulator can only hope to approximate this in the real world.  What has become 
generally recognised, however, is that regulators should be given broad statutory 
authority to exercise discretion in assessing the risk profile of a particular institution 
and to respond rapidly to developments in financial markets that affect risk-taking.  
For instance, this might involve controlling incentive arrangements for certain key 
personnel in the bank who exercise control over the bank’s leverage positions.   
 
In addition, the regulator may impose administrative penalties and civil 
sanctions on banks or their directors and employees for taking actions that threaten 
financial safety and soundness.  This type of discretion, however, can be criticised on 
the grounds that it places too much power in the hands of the regulator to act in a way 
that some might view to be arbitrary and capricious.  Indeed, the discretionary power 
of the regulator may result in discriminatory treatment between banks or individuals 
that might violate human rights legislation.  Moreover, it might violate a person’s 
right to have civil penalties or sanctions reviewed by a fair and impartial tribunal.168   
 
Regulatory discretion has been an important element of US banking 
regulation.  The objective of ‘safety and soundness’ under US banking law has always 
implied a broad discretionary power for US banking supervisory agencies to apply 
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and enforce prudential standards on banking institutions.  Before the 1980s, US 
federal banking law did not define the safety and soundness principle; this provided 
regulators with broad discretion to enforce banking law based on subjective factors 
that were not defined in regulation or statute.169   The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal in 
1983 restricted this broad authority in the Bellaire case by overturning a US 
regulator’s decision to require the capital standards of a bank viewed by the regulator 
to be weak to be higher than the capital charges applied to other banks.  The regulator 
had grounded its decision on its statutory authority to promote ‘safety and soundness’ 
of the banking system.  But the federal banking statute and regulation had not 
provided any apparent criteria to serve as a basis to justify the regulator in treating 
one bank differently from the others.  In the absence of any published statutory or 
regulatory criteria that demonstrated a rational reason to treat one bank differently 
from another, the court found the regulator’s decision to impose higher capital 
charges on one bank in relation to others to be a violation of equal protection under 
the law and due process of law.  The court essentially held that the regulator had acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously by treating the bank in a discriminatory manner on the 
basis of standards and criteria that were not apparent in statute or regulation.  The 
implication of the holding was that if Congress had expressly provided criteria in 
statute or had delegated power to the regulator to set criteria in regulations to justify 
the discriminatory treatment of banks that were a threat to the safety and soundness of 
the banking system, then such regulatory decisions would not have been arbitrary or 
capricious and therefore not in violation of US law.   
 
 
 A. International Lending Supervision Act of 1983 
 
Congress responded to the Bellaire decision and the sovereign debt crisis by 
enacting the US International Lending Supervision Act (ILSA), which provides that 
each federal banking agency shall require, by regulation, banking institutions to 
disclose to the public information regarding material foreign country exposure in 
relation to assets and capital.170  The ILSA also requires each appropriate federal 
banking agency to cause banking institutions to achieve and maintain adequate 
capital by establishing minimum levels of capital for such banking institutions and by 
using such other methods that the relevant agency deems appropriate.171  Each 
federal banking regulator shall have the authority to establish minimum capital levels 
and management standards for a banking institution according to discretionary 
authority exercised in the particular circumstances of the banking institution.172  In 
other words, the federal banking regulator had the discretionary authority to take 
remedial action against banks or the management of banks who had failed to manage 
the bank in a safe and sound manner, if the bank had failed to maintain capital at or 
above the minimum level or to have committed ‘an unsafe or unsound practice’ 
within the meaning of the federal banking statutes.173  The broad authority granted in 
the ILSA to federal banking regulators effectively overruled the Bellaire decision.  
ILSA conferred express enforcement powers on US federal bank regulators through 
the use of capital directives.174
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B. Deposit Insurance – The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and 
     FIDICIA 1991  
 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was established by statute during 
the Great Depression in 1931 to provide deposit insurance to the depositors of failed 
US banking institutions.  The FDIC is charged with the difficult task of administering 
the deposit insurance fund.  Its funding depends on risk premium payments (and the 
interest those payments earn) made into the fund by covered depository institutions.  
During its first sixty years, it assessed the insured institutions at the same rate flat rate 
for deposit-insurance coverage.  Although the FDIC was crucial for restoring 
depositor confidence in the US banking system following the 1940s and undoubtedly 
played an key role in the recapitalisation of US banks, it has been criticised for 
creating moral hazard among bank managers and depositors who perceive 
respectively that they can be bailed out for making poor lending decisions with 
depositor’s money. 
 
In 1991, as a response to savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, Congress sought 
to mitigate the moral hazard problem by enacting the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Act of 1991 (FIDICIA).    The risk premium charged on each deposit was 
made more risk sensitive based on the risk weightings of each depository institution.  
An institution, for example, that has low levels of capital as a percentage of its assets 
and liabilities will be given a higher risk weighting and thus be required to pay higher 
insurance premiums into the insurance fund.  The assessments that produce revenue 
for the deposit insurance fund enable the FDIC to absorb losses arising from a crisis 
caused by financial institution failure.   
 
Under FIDICIA, the FDIC175 has been vested with discretion to make 
determinations of unsafe and unsound banking practices in violation of the FDICIA 
that would place the insurance fund at risk.  Indeed, US courts have adopted a 
standard of review under federal banking law for determining the lawfulness of 
agency action in regulating prudential standards of banking institutions.  Indeed, in  
Doolin Security Savings Bank v. F.D.I.C., the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled 
that the applicable standard of review under 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (h)(2) for determining 
whether the FDIC abused its discretion in establishing a particular risk-based capital 
adequacy scheme for federally-insured depository institutions was that a Court: 
 
[C]annot reverse the FDIC Board action unless the findings upon which it is based 
are not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, or unless the 
remedies formulated by the Board constitute an abuse of discretion or are otherwise 
arbitrary and capricious.176 
 
In exercising its authority, the FDIC has discretion to adopt a risk-based capital 
assessment scheme and procedure structure under which the FDIC may terminate an 
institution’s insured status and terminate its banking license if it determines that the 
depository institution’s practices are unsafe and unsound.177  Before analysing this 
statutory scheme, it is important to provide a general background of the FDIC deposit 
insurance statute.     
   
FIDICIA established a risk-based assessment system under which the 
premiums paid by federally insured financial institutions are based on risks the 
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institutions pose to the insurance fund.  Specifically, Section 302(a) of the FDICIA 
requires the FDIC to establish final risk-based assessment regulations, and section 
302(f) authorises the FDIC to promulgate transitional regulations governing the time 
period between the flat-rate assessment system and the risk-based assessment system 
required under section 302(a).  The FDIC adopted the transitional regulations on 15 
September, 1992,178 and subsequently adopted the final regulations on 17 June, 
1993179.  Both regulations were codified under Title 12 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations § 327.180 
 
 In section 302(a) of the FDICIA, Congress defined a ‘risk-based assessment 
system’ as: 
 
 a system for calculating a depository institution’s semiannual assessment based on – 
 
(i) the probability that the deposit insurance fund will incur a loss with 
respect to the institution, taking into consideration the risks 
attributable to – 
(I) different categories and concentrations of assets; 
(II) different categories and concentrations of liabilities, both 
insured and uninsured, contingent and non-contingent; and 
(III) any other factors the [FDIC] determines are relevant to 
assessing such probability; 
(ii) the likely amount of any such loss; and 
(iii) the revenue needs of the deposit fund.181  
     
       
The FDIC has responded by using a risk-based classification system based on 
detailed reports and expert evaluations of the financial condition of an institution.  
The FDIC’s regulations require the agency to analyse objective ‘capital factors as well 
as subjective ‘supervisory’ factors.182  The capital factors determine the institution’s 
‘capital group’, signified as a 1, 2 or 3 in the risk classification. The supervisory risk 
factors determine the institution’s ‘supervisory sub-group,’ signified as an A, B, or C 
in the risk classification.183  Further, the regulations provide that the FDIC will 
assign an institution a supervisory subgroup based on the FDIC’s ‘consideration of 
supervisory evaluations provided by the institution’s primary federal regulator.’184   
 
Issues of Constitutional Due Process  
 
In determining whether FDIC procedures for issuing capital directives 
satisfied due process requirements of the US Constitution, the Fifth Circuit Court 
Appeals held in FDIC v. Coushatta185 that the FDIC must adhere to a three-factor 
inquiry that courts are required to use in determining what type of procedures satisfy 
due process before the government may deprive an entity of a property interest 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.186  The 
three factors are:  (1)  the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
(2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, 
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and 
(3) the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute requirement would entail.187  
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Essentially, due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the 
particular situation demands.188 
     
In assessing prudential supervisory practices, the Fifth Circuit in Coushatta 
concluded that procedures for determining capital adequacy and risk-based 
supervisory ratings satisfied due process.  The court reasoned that the private interest 
of accurate capital directives is significant but that the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of property because of the application of a directive is marginal.  The 
court noted that a predeprivation evidentiary hearing (as opposed to an informal 
hearing) was not warranted because a bank has adequate opportunity to respond to the 
notice through written procedures.  Also, the court found that the government’s 
interests is substantial because delay would considerably weaken the benefits from a 
prompt directive, which seeks to rectify a bank’s troublesome undercapitalization.  
Similarly, in Doolin, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the procedures allowing a bank to 
challenge a FDIC determination of risk-based capital ratings, and found the procedure 
to be in compliance with constitutional standards of due process.189  
 
The FDIC procedure allowing banks to contest their risk-based capital ratings 
meets the due process test because it provides banks with notice of its risk 
classification and an opportunity to challenge the classification through the review 
procedures established in the regulations.190   Accordingly, the Courts have held that 
the due process clause does not require a predeprivation evidentiary hearing before a 
particular risk-based weighting is applied to banks’ capital position.191   
 
Similarly, the Office of Thrift Supervision192 has discretion to 
determine whether the business activities of savings banks are ‘unsafe or unsound 
practices’ and thus in violation of prudential supervisory standards of federal banking 
law.  Such determinations may only be overruled by a court if it concludes that the 
agency action was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion, nor is there 
sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity and correctness 
afforded to the appointment.  The Courts have generally upheld the discretionary 
authority of the OTS to apply prudential supervisory standards to federal savings 
banks that rely on a combination of objective and subjective standards for determining 
whether the bank was acting in a prudential manner.193  These prudential 
assessments produce specific composite ratings of each savings bank. Banks may 
challenge the risk-based assessments that are applied to their activities by the OTS.  
The review procedure involves three-tier administrative review whereby an institution 
may challenge its risk-based ratings at the district level of the OTS, and then may 
appeal the decision to the OTS Director.  Once administrative review with the OTS is 
exhausted, an institution may seek review before an administrative law judge pursuant 
to the Administrative Procedure Act.194   
 
 Under the above legislation and regulations, federal banking regulators are 
thus given the authority to establish required minimum capital levels and to deny 
particular transactions or activities by banking institutions if they constituted ‘unsafe 
and unsound’ practices banking practice and to have general statutory enforcement 
powers to effect these standards.195 
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 The Challenge posed by Bank Holding Companies     
According to Akhgbe et al (2004), bank holding companies and financial 
conglomerates pose a special type of agency problem for regulators because these 
financial companies often own separate subsidiaries and divisions that perform 
various financial functions, often in multiple jurisdictions.  The complex structure of 
conglomerates and financial holding companies pose a particular type of agency 
problem which is not necessarily the same as within the individual bank or financial 
institution.  This is an important question because most banks and financial 
institutions operate within holding companies and multi-national financial 
conglomerates that are composed of hundreds of subsidiaries and affiliate companies 
that operate in multiple jurisdictions.  What is the nature of the principal-agent 
problem within these banking groups or conglomerates.  It may depend on the 
structure of the management within the conglomerate.  For instance, does the holding 
company have a centralized management structure controlled by the board of 
directors and managers of one company, or is it more diffuse with management 
authority shared among several or more subsidiaries and affiliates within the group?  
Identifying the exact nature of the principal-agent problem will likely depend on 
which company or individual(s) exercise, or have the ability to exercise, control over 
the group’s operations. Saunders (1990) argues that this will depend on whether there 
is alignment of interests and incentives between managers and the block shareholders. 
This view is based on the notion that there are two main factors affecting risk taking 
within the financial holding company: managers’ incentive and block ownership. 
The goal of regulating bank and financial holding companies should be to 
align the incentives of the managers and directors of the holding company with those 
of the managers and directors of the subsidiaries which they control.  The regulator 
has a further responsibility to ensure that the incentives of the holding company and 
its subsidiaries are socially optimal in so far as the social costs of financial risk-taking 
should be minimised throughout the conglomerate.  The evidence from block 
ownership in bank holding companies shows that the presence of safety nets (eg., 
lender of last resort) increases the incentive for risk-taking in holding company 
structures, and these incentives can be difficult to estimate because most financial 
holding companies in G10 countries operate in multiple jurisdictions, which have 
different levels of safety net protection.    
 
      US Regulation of Bank Holding Companies: The Legal Framework   
 
Since 1956, US banking law has sought to address the risks posed by managerial 
incentives and block shareholder interests within bank holding companies by adopting 
legislation that governs the structure and activities of these financial entities.  Bank 
holding companies are a type of financial conglomerate.  In modern financial markets, 
most banks operate in holding companies. In these corporate groups, banks may 
exercise control, or be controlled, or simply be affiliated to other banks and 
companies within the holding company structure.  The holding company structure of 
banks creates particular principal-agent tensions that require a different approach than 
what would be the case for individual banks.196  The Bank Holding Act of 1956 and 
the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 attempt to address the principal-
agent problem within the group structure of banks and financial firms.  To do so, the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) have been 
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granted broad authority to adopt regulations to govern the management of banking 
and financial holding companies.  These broad supervisory powers extend to 
considering and approving any proposal or transaction by a banking institution, or its 
affiliate, or the holding company which controls such banking institution, that would 
divert earnings, diminish capital, or otherwise impede such banking institution’s 
progress in achieving its minimum capital level.197  The Federal Reserve may deny 
such approval for particular transactions where it determines that certain management 
practices or transactions would adversely affect the ability of the banking institution 
to comply with such a plan.  These powers to regulate the management of bank and 
financial holding companies have been influenced by judicial decisions that have 
developed two important doctrines of prudential regulation: the source of strength 
requirement and change of bank control. 
 
Supervisory Authority for Bank Holding Companies: The Institutional 
Gap  
 
Statutory regulation of US bank holding companies began when Congress enacted the 
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHCA).198  The congressional intent behind 
the BHCA was to prevent the concentration of ownership and control of banking 
facilities, and to prevent the combination of both banking and non-banking enterprises 
so that banks would not engage in business wholly-unrelated to banking.199  The 
BHCA also addressed a concern regarding monopolistic control of credit and directed 
the Federal Reserve to review bank acquisitions under several standards, including 
financial and managerial soundness, and access to capital.200 
 
Specifically, the BHCA grants the Board supervisory control over the 
formation, structure and operation of bank holding companies and their non-bank 
subsidiaries.  Section 3(a) of the Act201 provides that no company may acquire 
control of a bank without prior approval by the Board.  In determining whether to 
approve an application, section 3(c) of the Act202 directs the Board to consider ‘the 
financial and managerial resources and future prospects of the company or companies 
and the banks concerned.’   
 
 The Board has argued that the Act has provided it broad authority to oversee 
the safety and soundness of bank holding companies and the financial institutions that 
operate within them.  The Board has also argued that section 3 (c) grants it statutory 
authority to impose source of strength charges on bank holding companies and the 
banks they own or control.  The alternative view has been that the Board only has 
authority to review the safety and soundness of bank holding companies and their 
banks and to impose source of strength charges when the bank holding company has 
applied to acquire or merge with a bank.      
 
The former view is supported by Board’s regulations adopted pursuant to its 
authority under the BHCA.  The Board adopted Regulation Y in 1984 which provides:  
 
§ 225.4 Corporate Practices 
 
(a) Bank holding company policy and operations.  (1) A bank holding company shall 
serve as a source of financial and managerial strength to its subsidiary banks and 
shall not contuct [sic] its operations in an unsafe or sound manner203  
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In April 1987, the Board reinforced this view by publishing a policy statement that 
provided:  
 
It is the policy of the Board that in serving as a source of strength to its subsidiary 
banks, a bank holding company should stand ready to use available resources to 
provide adequate capital funds to its subsidiary banks during periods of financial 
stress or adversity and should maintain the financial flexibility and capital-raising 
capacity to obtain additional resources for assisting its subsidiary banks. . .  
 
A bank holding company’s failure to meet its obligation to serve as a source of 
strength to its subsidiary bank(s), including an unwillingness to provide appropriate 
assistance to a troubled or failing bank, will generally be considered an unsafe or 
unsound banking practice in violation of Regulation Y, or both.204    
 
The Board also asserts broad authority to adopt whatever regulatory measures are 
necessary in this area by relying on section 5(b) of the BHCA205 that states:  
 
The Board is authorized to issue such regulations and orders as may be necessary to 
enable it to administer and carry out the purposes of this chapter and prevent evasions 
thereof.  
 
The case law has generally supported the Board’s authority in this area.  In 
Board of Governors v. First Lincolnwood Corp.206, the Supreme Court upheld the 
Board’s authority to impose source of strength requirements on a bank holding 
company as part of its application to acquire a bank.  The issue was whether the 
Board could deny the application based solely on the financial unsoundness of a bank 
within the holding company, or was the Board also required to show that the 
application would have had an uncompetitive effect on the banking industry.  The 
Supreme Court held that it was permissible for the Board to rely solely on a showing 
of financial unsoundness as grounds to reject the holding company’s application.     
The Supreme Court stated in relevant part: 
 
The language of the statute supports the Board’s interpretation of § 3 (c) as an 
authorization to deny applications on grounds of financial and managerial 
unsoundness even in the absence of any anti-competitive impact.  Section 3 (c) 
directs the Board to consider the financial and managerial resources and future 
prospects of the applicants and banks concerned ‘[i]n every case,’ not just in cases in 
which the Board finds that the transaction will have an anti-competitive effect..207   
 
The Court, however, was careful to state that its holding was not intended to 
extend the Board’s authority to day-to-day supervision of banks, but allowed the 
Board to disapprove an application to prevent the formation of an unsound holding 
company. 
 
In the dissent’s view, the Board, by looking beyond the transaction before it, 
attempted to exercise day-to-day regulatory authority over banks which Congress 
denied to it and conferred on the Comptroller. We disagree with the basic premise of 
the dissent’s argument. As the Board found, the effect of this transaction would have 
been the formation of a financially unsound bank holding company.  Thus, the 
Board’s attempt to prevent this effect and to induce respondent to form an enterprise 
that met the Board’s standards of financial soundness was entirely consistent with the 
language [of the statute].208  
 31
 
In First Lincolnwood the Supreme Court relied on the express provisions of section 3 
(c) that required the Board to consider financial soundness of the subsidiary bank in 
determining whether to approve a holding company’s application; however, the Court 
made it clear that it did not interpret the BHCA as granting the Board authority to 
regulate the day-to-day financial soundness of the subsidiary banks. 
 
 In a similar case, the Supreme Court in Board of Governors v. Dimension 
Financial Corp.,209 considered whether the Board exceeded its authority in 
expanding its regulatory coverage to include non-bank firms within bank holding 
company structures.  Under Regulation Y, the Board had defined non-bank 
institutions or non-bank financial firms as being subject to source of strength 
requirements.  The Court rejected this position by holding that the Board had 
exceeded its statutory authority in attempting to include non-bank financial firms 
within its regulatory authority.   
 
 These cases demonstrate that the primary purposes of the BHCA are to 
prevent the concentration of control of banking resources, and to separate banking 
from non-banking enterprises.  First Lincolnwood is narrowly written and expressly 
limits the Board’s authority, in respect to granting or denying a holding company 
application, to consider financial and managerial soundness of subsidiary banks.  
Section 3 (c) of the BHCA expressly grants this authority to the Board.  The BHCA, 
however, does not grant the Board authority to consider the financial and managerial 
soundness of the subsidiary banks after it approves the application, and First 
Lincolnwood finds this regulatory authority lacking in the day-to-day operations of a 
subsidiary bank.   
 
This view was further supported by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal in  
MCorp Financial Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.210 
MCorp presented the legal issue of whether the Federal Reserve Board had the 
authority to order a bank holding company to transfer funds to its ailing subsidiary 
when the order was not part of the holding company’s application to acquire a bank.  
The Board had argued that MCorp’s failure to transfer its assets to a weak banking 
subsidiary was an unsafe and unsound practice in violation of sections 1818(b)(1) and 
(3).211 The Board argued that MCorp had failed to act as a source of strength for its 
bank subsidiaries in violation of Board regulation and policies, and that this failure 
constituted an unsafe or unsound practice.  The Board therefore imposed source of 
strength charges on MCorp requiring it to inject funds into its banking subsidiaries.  
MCorp sought judicial review of the Board’s order by arguing that the Board did not 
have supervisory authority to issue source of strength capital directives to a bank 
holding company or to its banks unless the Board’s order was a condition for the 
company’s proposed acquisition or takeover of a bank.      
 
The MCorp case stands for the proposition that the Board does not have the 
authority to compel a solvent bank holding company to transfer its funds to its 
troubled subsidiaries, even for the purpose of maintaining the subsidiaries’ financial 
soundness.212  The enforcement of such a source of strength regulation would require 
a holding company to transfer funds to its troubled subsidiary banks.  The Fifth 
Circuit held that such a prudential requirement ‘can hardly be considered a generally 
accepted international standard of prudential operation.’213  The court observed that 
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such a transfer of funds would require the holding company to disregard its own 
corporation’s separate legal status and would amount to a wasting of the holding 
company’s assets in violation of its duty to its shareholders.  Further, the court noted 
that one of the main purposes of the BHCA was to separate banking from commercial 
enterprises, and that purpose would not be served if the Board is permitted to treat a 
holding company as merely an extension of its subsidiary bank.214  The Supreme 
Court upheld the Fifth Circuit’s ruling as it applies to the Federal Reserve Board’s 
authority to impose source of strength directives on bank holding companies.      
 
 Moreover, section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act addresses self-dealing 
among holding company subsidiaries.215  Section 23A prohibits a bank from 
extending credit to a nonbank affiliate unless the extension of credit is secured by 
collateral having a market value of at least 100 per centum of the loan.  For example, 
the Federal Reserve will institute proceedings against any bank holding company if it 
causes any of its subsidiary banks to extend unsecured credit to an affiliated 
institution of the bank holding company.216  The Federal Reserve has authority to 
seek an order against a holding company to make it cease and desist any transactions 
which violate the provisions of section 23A, or ‘to take affirmative action’ as may be 
appropriate.217   
 
Changes in Bank Control  
 
Another important issue regarding corporate governance of bank holding 
companies concerns regulating how shareholders and companies can acquire and 
relinquish control of banks.  Congress has defined any change in control of a US 
bank, whether by takeover, acquisition or other transfer of control, to be an unsafe and 
unsound banking practice, unless the change of control is approved in advance by the 
relevant federal banking authority.218  The CBCA provides: 
 
(1) No person, acting directly or through or in concert with one or more persons, shall 
acquire control of any insured depository institution through a purchase . . . of voting 
stock of such insured depository institution unless the appropriate Federal banking 
agency has been given sixty days’ prior written notice of such proposed acquisition . . 
. 219 
 
The control of a bank is ‘the power, directly or indirectly, to . . . vote 25 per centum or 
more of any class of voting securities of an insured depository institution.’220  
Control of a bank may be found if any group of shareholders enters an agreement to 
act in concert to acquire control of a bank.  Evidence of such agreement could be, 
inter alia, a proxy assignment, purchase and sale agreement, voting agreement, cross-
pledge, collateral guaranty, or cross guaranty.  In the absence of such formal 
agreements, the regulator may rely on circumstantial evidence to make a 
determination that a group acted in concert with the intent of obtaining control of a 
bank in violation of the statute.221  Essentially, to find concerted effort, an agreement 
need not be written and may be informal, and group activity may be proven 
circumstantially.222  Further, persons acting in concert need not know each other.223   
  
 In addition to the statutory provisions of the CBCA, Regulation O224 
specifically provides that a bank may not extend credit to officers, directors, or 
principal shareholders unless the extension of credit is ‘made on substantially the 
 33
same terms. . . as, and following credit underwriting procedures that are not less 
stringent than, those prevailing at the time’ for other persons.225  Moreover, the loan 
must be approved by a majority of the disinterested directors.226  Essentially, the 
bank cannot make loans to insiders (i.e. officers, directors, shareholders and their 
family members) unless the terms of the loan are on substantially the same terms as 
loans to others, and that standard underwriting procedures with respect to credit risk 
are followed.  The purpose of the Regulation is to prevent insiders from obtaining 
loans based on inadequate collateral capital that have above-normal credit and market 
risk.   
 
Moreover, Regulation O prohibits any other unsafe and unsound banking 
practices that may expose the bank to substantial losses.  Such unsafe and unsound 
practices may include generous compensation and employment agreements for 
directors and controlling shareholders.  For example, in Lindquist, the FDIC found 
that an unsound loan to an insider by a particular bank, which was controlled by 
another insider, violated Regulation O because it exceeded five percent of the capital 
and unimpaired surplus of the bank and did not receive approval of a majority of the 
disinterested directors on the bank’s board.  In addition, section 215.4 (a)(1) of 
Regulation O prevents a bank from providing a loan to an entity for which some of 
the proceeds are used to purchase shares in the lending bank, thus providing a capital 
infusion.  
 
D. The Regulation of Financial Holding Companies: the Case of the Financial 
Services Modernization Act 1999 
 
In 2000, Congress enacted the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 
(otherwise known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act)227, which is the most significant 
US banking legislation since the Glass-Steagall Act was of 1933.  The statute 
authorised the Federal Reserve Board to adopt regulations that allow bank holding 
companies or foreign banks to apply for a universal bank structure at the holding 
company level.  The new universal holding companies would be known as ‘Financial 
Holding Companies’ (‘FHCs’) and would be able to establish wholly-owned 
subsidiaries that could provide an array of financial services that were restricted under 
previous banking law.  For our purposes, the prudential supervision provisions are 
most important.  Section 103 of the Act requires that for a banking holding company 
to make an election to become a FHC, it must show that its subsidiaries are ‘well 
capitalised’ and that affiliated or subsidiary institutions are ‘well-managed’. 
 
 A well-capitalised bank essentially means that a bank has and maintains at 
least the capital levels required to be well-capitalised under the capital adequacy 
regulations or guidelines applicable to the bank under the ‘prompt corrective action’ 
standards of section 38 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.228  The Act does not 
require that a financial holding company (FHC) meet a specific consolidated capital 
standard to operate as a holding company as a condition for engaging in expanded 
financial activities through non-bank subsidiaries.  However, because a FHC is also a 
bank holding company (BHC), the Federal Reserve Board’s Regulation Y229 requiring 
financial and managerial soundness for a BHC and its bank subsidiaries when it 
applies to acquire a bank will also apply to FHCs when they apply to acquire banks. 
These source of strength requirements will also apply to BHCs and foreign banks 
when they apply to the Board for FHC status.   
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 Together, the Bank Holding Company Act and the Financial Services 
Modernization Act represent important efforts to address governance problems with 
bank/financial holding companies, but serious questions are raised by the MCorp 
regarding the scope and extent of regulatory authority of the Federal Reserve Board to 
exercise prudential oversight in this area.   
 
V. BANK REGULATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS  
The responsibility for the overall governance of a financial institution should lay 
with management, which should have responsibility for compliance with appropriate 
standards of conduct and adherence to proper procedures. UK financial legislation 
provides the FSA with a mandate to establish these standards, rules, and 
procedures.230 The nature of the risk posed by banks and financial firms necessitates 
regulatory intervention to balance the interests of the various stakeholder groups 
while ensuring a profitable business strategy that promotes economic growth but does 
not undermine safety and soundness concerns. Regulation, however, should not be 
responsible for removing risk from the marketplace, as such risk is inherent in the 
enterprise system. Rather, it should attempt to reduce asymmetries of information and 
other institutional barriers that cause market failure. It should seek to align the various 
incentives of shareholders, creditors, managers, and customers to create a more 
incentive-compatible framework for the pricing of financial risk. To do this, there 
must be periodic evaluation of risk-management processes within a regulated entity, 
and this must involve interaction with regulators and external auditors.  
 
Another important objective of corporate governance in the financial sector is the 
control of operational risk. Operational risk is defined as “the risk of loss through a 
failure of systems or deliberate or negligent conduct of staff.”231 High levels of 
operational risk may have systemic implications when they involve large investment 
firms with global operations. This was clearly the case in the Barings and Daiwa 
collapses,232 which resulted from senior management’s failure to implement adequate 
internal control procedures for staff and broader issues of ensuring that various 
subsidiaries of the financial group were complying adequately with home and host 
state regulatory standards. What is clear from the Barings and Daiwa fiascos is that 
home and host country regulators must communicate more and coordinate their 
investigations along the lines of international standards for supervising multinational 
conglomerates. They must adhere to the generally accepted standards of consolidated 
supervision based on home country control.  
 
The FSA addresses operational risk by requiring banks and financial firms to be 
managed by internal procedures designed to prevent misconduct or negligence. 
Because the regulator cannot practically expend the resources to ensure that such 
internal procedures are adhered to on a day-to-day basis, senior management must 
take this responsibility. Members of senior management must make themselves aware 
of the nature of the firm’s business, such as its internal control procedures and its 
policies regarding the allocation of risk for particular activities. They must also ensure 
that they can capably discharge their responsibilities. They must clearly set forth lines 
of responsibility in the management command structure and provide adequate access 
to communication for those involved at all levels of the firm’s operations. All relevant 
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information concerning the firm’s risk must be made available in a timely manner to 
both management and the regulator.  
 
The specific structure of the firm’s internal organization should be different based 
on the following factors: the firm’s size, the nature of its business, and the risks and 
activities it undertakes. Despite these differences, the regulation of market 
intermediaries and investment firms should do the following: (a) set high standards of 
fair dealing with customers to ensure market integrity; (b) have clear terms of 
engagement in contracts with customers; (c) obtain all relevant information on 
customers’ backgrounds; (d) make adequate disclosure to customers to allow them to 
make a balanced and informed investment decision; (e) maintain high levels of staff 
training in the sale of products; (f) develop proper protection for customer assets; 
(g) comply with any relevant laws, codes, or standards as they apply to the firm, as 
well as with all internal policies and procedures; and (h) avoid any conflicts of interest 
to ensure fair treatment of customers and the public. 
 
Moreover, the FSA rules emphasize that senior management must be directly 
responsible for all firm policies regarding proprietary trading.233 The firm should 
make available to the regulator information regarding the firm’s own proprietary 
trading and determine that the firm’s net capital is sufficient in relation to the firm’s 
risk exposure. This information should provide an understanding of the firm’s overall 
business and risk profile, including that of its subsidiaries and affiliates. Management 
should also have personal liability for overseeing the firm’s compliance with 
regulations regarding margin trading and the detection of conflicts of interest or 
manipulative practices.  
 
The FSMA statutory and regulatory framework, as it applies to senior 
management controls and internal governance procedures for banks, could serve as a 
possible model for reforming corporate-governance practices in the nonfinancial 
sector. The FSMA regulatory model emphasizes the regulator’s role in representing 
stakeholder interests and in seeking to achieve the overall public interest of economic 
growth and a safe and sound banking system. The UK Combined Code or company 
law could be amended to allow the company regulator—the Department of Trade and 
Industry—to play a more active role in working with the senior management of 
nonfinancial companies to devise corporate-governance standards and practices that 
recognize broader stakeholder interests. The regulator could be given a more formal 
role to assist directors in devising internal control systems and accountability 
structures that allow them to fulfill fiduciary duties to the company. To achieve this 
objective, it would be necessary for the regulator to play a balancing role between the 
interests of shareholders and creditors and other stakeholder interests. The type of 
compliance program would depend on a number of factors, including whether the 
company is listed or not, whether it is large or small, and what type of systemic 
impact the company’s operations have on the broader economy. Moreover, the 
regulation of corporate governance should be backed by civil and, in some cases, 
criminal sanctions, but the regulator should apply the various standards flexibly in 
consultation with the company and the relevant stakeholder groups.  
 
UK financial regulation provides a model in this regard, showing how a 
comprehensive framework of corporate governance can be implemented in active 
collaboration between the regulator and senior management in a way that allows the 
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regulator to play a balancing role between owners, management, and broader 
stakeholder interests. A particular aspect of UK bank regulation involves its 
recognition of the relationship between the internal governance framework of banks 
and the incentive structure for risk-taking. Because banks pose a systemic threat, the 
FSA seeks to protect the broader public interest by requiring compliance programs 
that promote the efficient pricing of risk to enhance macro-economic performance and 
financial stability.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Many observers agree that the banking and financial industry is one sector that 
has been greatly affected by major structural changes due, in part, to the pressures of 
increased globalisation. The consequences of such changes include, but are not 
limited to, increased competition, squeezed profit margins, and intense pressure to cut 
prices and to quickly develop and market new products with shorter life cycles—all 
within significantly shorter turnaround times. In addition, the banking industry has 
been subjected to the competitive forces of deregulation in both its activities and its 
prices. These structural changes in the financial markets necessitate stronger 
regulatory frameworks of financial regulation, especially in the corporate governance 
of banks. 
 
A major corporate governance challenge for banks involves the principal-agent 
problem and how it can undermine financial stability when the incentives of bank 
management and directors are not aligned with those of the owners of the firm. This 
may result in different risk preferences for management as compared to the firm’s 
owners, as well as other stakeholders, including creditors, employees, and the public. 
Because of high transaction costs and institutional barriers, aligning the interests of 
these groups may be difficult, if not impossible, without regulatory intervention.  
 
Under the FSMA, it is the financial regulator’s role to represent the public’s 
interest in seeing that banks and financial firms are regulated efficiently to enhance 
the safety and soundness of the banking system and thereby increase economic 
growth. UK banking regulation, as implemented by the FSA, contains prudential 
supervisory and regulatory standards to enhance the corporate governance of UK 
banks and financial institutions. These standards seek to address the principal-agent 
problem through (a) enhanced monitoring; (b) improved disclosure and accounting 
practices; (c) better enforcement of corporate governance rules and the corporate 
governance framework; and (d) strengthening of institutions through market 
discipline. They also require banks to establish internal compliance programs to 
monitor other types of risk arising from the growing problem of financial crime.  
 
This paper suggests that bank regulation should seek to balance the interests of 
shareholders with creditors, depositors, and other stakeholder interests in order to 
achieve the overall objective of financial stability.  UK financial policy recognizes the 
importance of authorizing the financial regulator to balance these interests to protect 
the safety and soundness of the financial system and to promote economic growth and 
development. In contrast, US banking regulation adopts a more prescriptive approach 
in which the regulator applies more precise and uniform criteria for assessing the 
safety and soundness of a banking institution.  The regulator is concerned not only 
with financial stability but with vindicating the rights of creditors and depositors to 
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the extent that it protects the deposit insurance fund.  It is necessary that the regulator 
have sufficient discretion to achieve these objectives and not be unnecessarily 
circumscribed by judicial review, as the experience of US regulators reveals.  This 
paper suggests that US judicial intervention in the regulation of bank and financial 
holding companies regarding source of strength requirements prevents the regulator 
from taking the necessary prudential measures to ensure that bank holding companies 
are well-capitalised.   
 
It would be too extreme to describe financial regulation as a substitute for 
corporate governance practices—it would be more accurate to describe its role as 
reducing the collective-action problem by ensuring that the broader standards and 
objectives of financial regulation are adhered to for the good of the broader economy 
and for most of the various stakeholder interests. The advent of Basel II and 
international corporate governance standards for financial institutions necessitates that 
bank regulators from all relevant jurisdictions address these issues in a more 
systematic way than what has been the case in the past. 
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